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peals from improperly procured acquittals.17 It will further tend to foster
a symmetrical and uniform development of criminal law, at least within each
state, by subjecting rulings of every trial court, in favor of the accused
as well as against him, to appellate review. s It has also been suggested
that such a statute will have a wholesome effect on the character of crimi-
nal trials and agencies of law administration and enforcement by subjecting
the conduct of the defense of an accused to the scrutiny of an appellate
court. 9  C. J. D.
LABOR - TRADE UNIONS - LIABILITY FOR VIOLENCE - [Federal]. - The
United Electric Coal Companies secured an injunction in 1935 which com-
pelled the defendant Progressive Mine Workers of America to discontinue
its campaign of violence arising out of the jurisdictional dispute between the
Progressives and the United Mine Workers in the Illinois Coal Fields.1 After
establishing its right to an injunction,2 the plaintiff company filed a motion
for assessment of damages caused by the destructive methods of the Progres-
sives. Held, that all damages suffered by the plaintiff employer as a result
of illegal activities of the Progressives be assessed against the defendant
union.8
It is settled that a union may be held liable in damages for unlawful
boycotts and picketing,4 for causing breach of contract, and for causing a
17. Miller, Appeals by State in Criminal Cases (1926) 36 Yale L. J.
486, 504.
18. See People v. Ah Leo (1915) 28 Cal. App. 164, 151 Pac. 749; State v.
Johnson (1918) 139 Minn. 500, 166 N. W. 123; Alt v. State (1911) 88
Neb. 259, 129 N. W. 432; State v. Lee (1873) 10 R. I. 494; State v. Elder
(1924) 130 Wash. 612, 228 Pac. 1016.
19. Miller, Appeals by State in Criminal Cases (1926) 36 Yale L. J.
486, 506-512. Thus even though a defense attorney may be in contempt and
subject himself to discipline personally, an acquittal of the accused can
not be challenged in absence of collusion on the part of the defendant.
Goodhart v. State (1911) 84 Conn. 60, 78 Atl. 853; In re Cary (Minn. 1925)
206 N. W. 402.
1. An indication of the methods employed in the dispute may be found
in People v. Beacham (1934) 358 II. 373, 193 N. E. 205.
2. Electric Coal Companies v. George Rice et al. (C. C. A. 7, 1937) 80
F. (2d) 1, reversing (D. C. E. D. Ill. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 635.
3. Unreported. The original decree awarded $117,000 damages. A mo-
tion for rehearing, to re-assess damages, is now pending.
4. Shinsky v. Tracy (1916) 226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957, L. R. A. 1917C,
1053; St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union (1917) 97
Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665.
5. O'Neil v. Behanna (1897) 182 Pa. 236, 37 At. 843; R and W Hat
Shop, Inc. v. Sculley (1922) 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55, 29 A. L. R. 551. How-
ever, certain decisions, notably in New York, permit unions to carry on
activities which in other jurisdictions would be regarded as inducing breach
of contract. The decisions may be distinguished on the ground that the
courts refused to find any contract between employer and employee which
could be broken. See Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin (1926) 216
App. Div. 663, 215 N. Y. S. 753; Interborough Transit Co. v. Green (1928)
131 Misc. 682, 227 N. Y. S. 258. Cf. Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers (1920) 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079.
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discharge of employees.6 But under what conditions will a union be held
liable for violence during a strike?7 Ordinarily, in those jurisdictions which
permit unions to be sued in the common name, the customary rules of
agency will be applied.8 Hence, there seems to be little dissent from the
proposition that, if previous authorization by the union for the commission
of violence is proved, damages may be recovered.9 This authorization may
be either express or implied.' 0 The courts, however, differ as to what con-
stitutes a subsequent ratification by the union of the independent acts of its
members during a strike. The federal courts have long held to the view
that a failure on the part of the union to discipline the member who occa-
sioned the damage signifies a ratification by the union. 1 Sufficiently bind-
ing ratification has been found in the fact that the union paid the fines of
members found guilty of violence or employed attorneys to defend union
members accused of violence.12 Some decisions declare that only an express
disavowal of these independent acts will relieve the union.'s Other decisions
declare, and perhaps too broadly to be predicated upon any principles of
agency, that the union will be liable for damages, even though there is no
definite proof that its members were the actual cause of the destruction.14
6. These are usually based on master and servant rules. Carter v. Oster
(1908) 134 Mo. App. 146, 112 S. W. 995; Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett
(1916) 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N. Y. S. 279.
7. For liability due to violent activities of a union's officers and agents,
see: Clarkson v. Laiblan (1918) 202 Mo. App. 682, 216 S. W. 1029; Michaels
v. Hillman (1920) 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. S. 195.
8. Great Northern R. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists (D. C.
Mont. 1922) 283 Fed. 557; Excelsior Mfg. and Supply Co. v. Sound Equip-
ment, Inc. (C. C. A. 7, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 725.
9. Tannenbaum v. Hofbauer (1931) 142 Misc. 120, 253 N. Y. S. 90;
Great Northern R. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists (D. C. Mont.
1922) 283 Fed. 557; Michaels v. Hillman (1920) 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. S.
195.
10. United States v. Railway Employees' Dept. A. F. of L. (D. C. N. D.
Ill. 1922) 283 Fed. 479; Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1916) 236 Fed. 964.
11. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche S. M. v. Stevedores' & L. B. Soc. (D. C.
E. D. La. 1920) 265 Fed. 397; United States v. Railway Employees' Dept.,
A. F. of L. (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1922) 283 Fed. 479; Alaska S. S. Co. v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1916) 263 Fed. 964.
State courts are also influenced by the failure to discipline: United Trac-
tion Co. v. Droogan (1921) 115 Misc. 672, 189 N. Y. S. 39; Franklin Union
No. 4 v. People (1906) 220 Ill. 355, 77 N. E. 176.
12. The court seemed to think this implied ratification in Hillenbrand v.
Building Trades Council (1904) 14 Ohio Dec. 628.
13. Hillenbrand v. Building Trades Council (1904) 14 Ohio Dec. 628;
United States v. Railway Employees' Dept., A. F. of L. (D. C. N. D. Ill.
1922) 283 Fed. 479.
14. These decisions apparently are based upon the theory that once in-
stituting a strike, the union assumes the risk of lawlessness by outsiders.
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef (C. C. D. Neb. 1902) 120 Fed. 102; United States
v. Railway Employees' Dept., A. F. of L. (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1922) 283 Fed.
479; Clarkson v. Laiblan (1919) 202 Mo. App. 682, 216 S. W. 1029; contra,
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Blowers' Ass'n (1899) 59 N. J. Eq.
49, 46 Atl. 208.
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Apparently, any attempt on the part of the union to condone violence, or
any failure to take steps to avoid violence, will be looked upon as ratifica-
tion of destructive methods.
In those jurisdictions which refuse to recognize the union as an entity,
the suit for damages cannot be brought against the union as a unit.15 Al-
though this procedural difficulty is decidedly conclusive in some states,10 the
doctrine of agency, combined with that of conspiracy, has produced a sig-
nificant result. Where a plaintiff is forced to rely upon a suit against the
individual members, the union funds may be used, as was done in the
Danbury Hatters case,'17 to satisfy the individual judgments, for no respon-
sible union will stand by and watch a member's property be attached for
violence committed by the union as a unit. It would seem that if many
unions voluntarily pay the individual judgments, the arguments of those
who assert the procedural immunity of the union itself are weakened con-
siderably. Whatever the practical result reached may be, the conspiracy
doctrine, as in the case of the agency doctrine, has been variously inter-
preted by the courts. Is a union member liable as a "conspirator" although
he personally did not participate in the violence or did not even know of it?
Some courts declare that merely a continued membership in the union after
the commission of violence will be indicative of the status of a conspirator.' s
This view, enabling a plaintiff to establish a conspiracy as to inactive mem-
bers tends greatly to produce the above-mentioned practical result. Other
courts repudiate this entirely and declare that knowledge and participation
in the violence must be shown before any individual member may be held
liable.19 Other decisions flatly state that liability will not extend to indi-
vidual members not specially connected with the officers and agents of the
union.20 The rigid liability imposed upon individual members may be a
15. For cases holding unincorporated associations cannot be sued in the
common name, see: Hajek v. Bohemian & Slavonian Benev. Soc. (1896)
66 Mo. App. 568; Clark v. Grand Lodge (1931) 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S. W. (2d)
404; Forest City Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
(Mo. App. 1938) 111 S. W. (2d) 934; Tyler v. Boot & Shoe Workers' Union
(1933) 285 Mass. 54, 188 N. E. 509.
16. The allowance of representative suits relieves this procedural diffi-
culty in some instances. McIntyre v. Live Stock Shipping Ass'n (1928) 222
Mo. App. 935, 11 S. W. (2d) 77; Cahill v. Plumbers' etc., & Helpers' Local
93 (1925) 238 Ill. App. 123.
17. Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 310, 52 L. ed. 488.
It is reported that the American Federation of Labor settled the Danbury
strike for about $150,000. New York Times, Jan. 14, 1938, p. 12:6.
18. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists (C. C. E. D.
IU. 1911) 190 Fed. 910; O'Neil v. Behanna (1897) 182 Pa. 236, 37 At. 843;
contra, Schneider v. Local Union No. 60 (1906) 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700;
Michaels v. Hillman (1920) 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. S. 195; cf. Church
Shoe Co. v. Turner (1926) 218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S. W. 232.
19. Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co. (1923) 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042.
In Missouri the liability of members depends largely upon whether the
association is organized for profit. Stone v. Guth (Mo. 1937) 102 S. W.
(2d) 738.
20. Michaels v. Hillman (1920) 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. S. 195.
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compensatory measure for plaintiffs who, because of procedural obstacles,
cannot reach the union fund directy.,1
For several years after the decision in the Danbury Hatters case, the
allowance of damage suits against labor unions was regarded as potentially
more threatening to labor than the injunction.2 2 The second showing of the
damage suit as a menacing weapon was the Coronado Coal case. 23 Although
the Supreme Court firmly established the federal rule permitting suits
against unincorporated associations, the practical effect of the case was to
show one important restriction upon the use of damage suits. There, the
plaintiff was forced to bear his cost of the litigation, which was far more
than the damages received.24 This, coupled with the fact that successful
damage suits against unions are on the decrease,2 5 indicates that such suits
are not too remunerative. It is submitted that in view of this feeling of the
courts and of the legislatures as reflected in the Norris-LaGuardia 26 and
Wagner Acts,27 a plaintiff who sues a union for a large sum should prove
his case within a comparatively short time-prolonged litigation may prove
too expensive. When it is considered that the plaintiff employer in the in-
stant case was a third party to the dispute, protection of his interests seems
to be in accord with sound justice. W. E.
LABOR-VALmITY or CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENT-[New York].-A closed
shop agreement between an employer and an exclusive bargaining agency of
the employees was held not contrary to public policy in the recent New York
case of Williams -. Quill.1 The rapid transit companies had entered into a
21. Illustrative of the cases in which judgments rendered against unions
were recovered from the individual members are: F. R. Patch Mfg. Co. v.
Capeless et al. (1906) 79 Vt. 1, 63 Atl. 938; Patterson & Co. v. Building
Trades Council of Wilkes-Barre (1902) 11 Pa. Dist. 500.
22. There are only a few cases, other than the instant decision, in which
large damages were assessed against labor. The Danbury case cost labor
around $150,000 (supra, note 17) ; labor expended nearly $400,000 to com-
promise the case of Southern Illinois Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
(1923) 6 Law and Labor 295 (settled out of court).
23. The progressive history of the case is found in Dowd v. United Mine
Workers (C. C. A. 8, 1916) 235 Fed. 1; (1917) 242 U. S. 653; Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (C. C. A. 8, 1919) 258 Fed. 829; United
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570,
66 L. ed. 995, 27 A. L. R. 762; Finley v. United Mine Workers (C. C. A.
8, 1924) 300 Fed. 972; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1925)
268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L. ed. 963.
24. Newspapers of the period of Oct. 14, 1927, state that the compromise
reached gave the plaintiff company $27,500. The costs of each party was
estimated to total between $100,000 and $200,000. See New York Times,
Oct. 14, 1927, p. 7:5.
25. Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes (1932) 139. The author
points out that the only concentration of such suits was immediately follow-
ing the Danbury case.
26. (1932) 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. sees. 101-115.
27. (1935) 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. sees. 151-166.
1. (1938) 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547.
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